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economy’s lack of job creation, and I have done
so in a number of speeches. However, if we can
create a little distance, perhaps by thinking about
the likely assessment of this period several years
hence, I suspect that we will marvel at the econ-
omy’s resilience in the face of all these shocks.
How resilient has the economy been? The
recession of 2001 was mild, measured by the total
decline in real GDP and by the duration of the
decline. GDP rose by 2.8 percent over the four
quarters of 2002. Forecasters anticipate that GDP
growth will remain positive this year and next,
at a gradually rising rate.
Why has the economy been so resilient? The
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis devoted its main
essay in its Annual Report for 2001 to exactly
this question. The essay, written at the end of
2001 and early 2002, focused on the sources of
the economy’s resilience because that topic
seemed highly appropriate in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11.
Our conclusion was that the economy sur-
vived the shock of terrorist attacks so well because
of four extremely important features of the current
U.S. economy. First, the United States enjoys
vigorously competitive markets, which promote
rapid and efficient adjustment to new circum-
stances. Second, the country has a robust financial
system; the banking system is well capitalized,
and few banks have failed in recent years. Third,
despite current strains, federal and state govern-
ments for the most part are in a sound fiscal posi-
tion. True, many governments are experiencing
significant budget deficits, but fiscal positions
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here is no way I can discuss the cur-
rent economic situation without start-
ing with the observation that the U.S.
economy is dealing with shock after
shock after shock: The 9/11 attacks; threats of
additional terrorism on U.S. shores or against
U.S. interests abroad; corporate governance scan-
dals; bankruptcies of large firms; war in Iraq;
SARS; oil price spikes. I’ve left out the large
decline in the stock market, starting in early
2000, because that decline is probably more a
consequence of downward revisions of earnings
forecasts than a cause. Still, the rather sudden
transition from an environment of unbridled
optimism to one of caution and the associated
stock market decline has certainly not been a
positive influence on the economy.
There are several ways to react to this list of
shocks, but before I do so I want to emphasize
that the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
If I were back in the classroom teaching a
course in macroeconomics, I could ask my stu-
dents to analyze the effects on the economy of
each of these shocks. A student who told me that
any of these shocks would raise economic growth
and expand employment would not be a good
candidate for an “A” grade, unless he or she had
an extraordinarily clever analytical story to tell.
As we live through this period day by day,
we can express our disappointment over theare fundamentally sound in that the deficits are
generally not huge relative to GDP and govern-
ments retain ample taxing power to raise addi-
tional revenues if they so choose. Fourth, the
nation enjoys low inflation and monetary stability.
The Bank’s Annual Report essay emphasized
that these four elements of economic strength have
not always been staples of the U.S. landscape.
I’ll not repeat the essay here, but anyone familiar
with U.S. economic history can point to episodes
where one or more of the four elements was
compromised.
What impresses me about the current situation
is how well the economy has handled multiple
severe shocks. I cannot guarantee that the modest
economic growth rate of last year will continue
without interruption, but I do think that is the
most likely outcome. The consensus of the Blue
Chip panel of economic forecasters in its most
recent release (April 10, 2003) is for real GDP,
measured by the annual level of GDP for the year,
to grow by 2.4 percent this year and 3.5 percent
next year. Not one of the panel of 53 forecasters
expects a decline in real GDP this year or next.
Many observers have pointed to the role
played by the Federal Reserve’s policy response
as the economy weakened over the course of 2001.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
reduced rates aggressively once the economic
weakness became apparent. I hear some people
say that monetary policy is not working, but find
that position hard to fathom. Would the auto com-
panies have introduced zero-interest financing
incentives if interest rates had remained high?
Would we have experienced a continuing housing
boom if rates had remained high? Would we have
seen the mortgage-refinancing boom that has
helped to support households’ discretionary
expenditures if rates had remained high? The
answer to all these questions is “most certainly
not.”
What is not generally appreciated is the central
role played by an entrenched environment of low
and stable inflation. Inflation has remained low
and, at least as important, so have inflation expec-
tations. Often in the past, as I have documented
at some length elsewhere, the Fed’s response to
developing recession has been limited by concern
that inflation and inflation expectations would
be boosted by premature easing of monetary pol-
icy.1 Over the last five years, inflation has been
well contained, and inflation expectations remark-
ably low.
How did the low inflation environment
become so entrenched? The answer is that years
of disciplined monetary policy have created a
conviction almost everywhere that inflation will
remain low because the Fed will do what is nec-
essary to achieve that result. Indeed, in the last
year or two the talk has been of the possibility of
deflation, rather than the risk of Fed overreaction
creating inflation. However, when we examine
survey evidence on inflation expectations, and
evidence from the yield spread between conven-
tional and indexed Treasury bonds, talk of defla-
tion is just that—talk. The evidence does not
support the view that the talk has affected the
way people behave.
Resisting inflation pressures has at times not
been very popular, but doing so has been an
investment that is now paying off in spades. The
shocks hitting the economy have not created infla-
tion fears, as past shocks have so often done. The
Fed has not had to deal with the possibility that
easing policy might create inflation fears. Inflation
stability, therefore, has been an investment that
has permitted a vigorous policy response to the
spate of shocks hitting the economy in recent
years. Nor have inflation fears affected the way
market participants have responded to the shocks.
Without inflation uncertainty, the economy has
adjusted quickly and efficiently.
I’ve emphasized the importance of the econ-
omy’s resilience in the face of multiple negative
shocks, but should also emphasize that there is
evidence of an extremely important positive
shock in recent years—the sustained growth of
labor productivity. The trend tilted up in 1995;
what is truly remarkable is that productivity
growth remained high as the economy slowed in
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1 “Inflation, Recession and Fed Policy,” Midwest Economic Education Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, April 11, 2002.2000, fell into recession in 2001 and then recov-
ered slowly during 2002. Measured over four
quarters of the year, productivity in the nonfarm
business sector rose by 2.1 percent in 2000, 1.9
percent in 2001, and 4.1 percent in 2002. Given
the pace of output growth, this productivity per-
formance meant that employment growth was
significantly negative during the recession and
roughly flat last year. Stagnant employment
growth is an important problem, but I think that
the sustained high productivity growth bodes
well for employment and output growth over the
long run. Productivity data, rather than just a gut
feeling, justify an optimistic long-term outlook.
As for coming quarters, I have no way of fore-
casting what additional negative shocks might
be headed our way, or how rapidly the effects
of recent adverse shocks will wear off. I do not
believe that the Fed can do anything directly to
deal with overcapacity in the telecom industry
or reductions in travel due to security and SARS
concerns. People delaying spending so they can
follow the war on TV will not start shopping
because of anything the Fed can do. What I do
believe is that the Federal Reserve will respond
to changing circumstances as required to main-
tain low inflation and a financial environment
consistent with maximum sustainable growth in
employment and output.
I often get questions, usually with a wry smile,
asking me about the probable direction of Fed
policy. I have a stock answer, and it is not a coy
answer. Monetary policy is driven by new infor-
mation. My position at each FOMC meeting is
that the intended fed funds rate should be set at
the level that provides the best chance of fostering
healthy economic growth and sustained low infla-
tion, taking into account everything we know.
If I knew for sure that available information
would justify a different intended fed funds rate
at the next FOMC meeting, then I would argue for
moving to that rate right away. Between meetings,
we receive a flow of new information, consisting
of formal statistical releases, anecdotal reports
from contacts across the country, new analytical
insights generated by research staff and events of
all sorts with possible implications for the course
of the economy. Important information is inher-
ently unpredictable. To the extent information is
predictable, I have already factored into my think-
ing experts’ best guesses about what will happen.
Deviations from best guesses, obviously, are
unforecastable.
It is this new information that drives changes
in the FOMC’s setting of the intended federal funds
rate. For this reason, and not because I am being
coy, I cannot predict what will be the appropriate
policy setting at the next FOMC meeting.
Looking ahead, in time, financial stability
and the inherent growth potential of the U.S.
economy will come to dominate the situation.
Arriving information will take a more favorable
turn. Fed policy will respond as the new informa-
tion makes the case. That more favorable economic
conditions will come is my optimistic message,
though I have no idea as to when more rapid
growth will appear.
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